Perspective on Risk - March 6, 2024 (Boeing's Culture)
A short post, so I hope you don’t mind the higher frequency.
Lessons in Operational Risk & Culture From Boeing
Boeing has had its share of problems.
An FAA-commissioned panel has put out Section 103 Organization Designation Authorizations (ODA) for Transport Airplanes Expert Panel Review Report with its findings.
Here are the principal findings from the executive summary: I’ve reformatted and highlighted a bit and added the definition of the acronyms.
The Expert Panel observed a disconnect between Boeing’s senior management and other members of the organization on safety culture. Interviewees, including ODA (Organization Designation Authorization) Unit Members, also questioned whether Boeing’s safety reporting systems would function in a way that ensures open communication and non-retaliation. The Expert Panel also observed inadequate and confusing implementation of the five components of a positive safety culture (Reporting Culture, Just Culture, Flexible Culture, Learning Culture, and Informed Culture).
The Expert Panel found Boeing’s SMS (safety management systems) procedures reflect the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the FAA SMS frameworks. However, the Boeing SMS procedures are not structured in a way that ensures all employees understand their role in the company’s SMS. The procedures and training are complex and in a constant state of change, creating employee confusion especially among different work site and employee groups. The Expert Panel also found a lack of awareness of safety-related metrics at all levels of the organization; employees had difficulty distinguishing the differences among various measuring methods, their purpose, and outcomes.
Boeing’s restructuring of the management of the ODA unit decreased opportunities for interference and retaliation against UMs, and provides effective organizational messaging regarding independence of UMs. However, the restructuring, while better, still allows opportunities for retaliation to occur, particularly with regards to salary and furlough ranking. This influences the ability of UMs to execute their delegated functions effectively.
The Expert Panel also found additional issues at Boeing that affect aviation safety, which include inadequate human factors consideration commensurate to its importance to aviation safety and lack of pilot input in aircraft design and operation.
As the report goes through, Boeing had the right process written down in its procedures.
But there was a cultural disconnect. Metrics were not clear, procedures changed frequently, training (and understanding) was inconsistent, and organizational structure inhibited the effective function of the quality control units.
Here are a few more comments from within the report:
… many Boeing employees did not demonstrate knowledge of Boeing’s enterprise-wide safety culture efforts, nor its purpose and procedures.
… a majority of Boeing employees did not have skillful awareness with the concepts of Just Culture and Reporting Culture.
… managers that are authorized to oversee employee performance evaluations, salary decisions, promotions, and disciplinary actions might also be tasked with investigative duties in the SMS framework. This arrangement could lead to a manager investigating a report within their own reporting chain, potentially compromising Boeing’s commitment to a non-retaliatory and impartial environment.
Employees did not understand how to utilize the different reporting systems, which reporting system to use and when. Employees also preferred to avoid all reporting systems, including Speak Up, and favored to report issues to their manager
… could not verify whether safety concerns reported directly to the management chain were captured and resolved in a systematic manner
Thought I read that they lost many well skilled technicians from Covid-inspired retirement. Those older employees were a major loss of talent. Many companies are indeed vey quick to retire older, higher paid employees only to rue their value-added. Boeing should be an example in the same direction